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Perspectives on Causal Specificity 
 
 
Abstract 
Causal specificity is a measure of how important a cause is relative to another. Waters (2007) has 
developed a theory of causation that deals with specificity. Weber (2006, 2017a, 2017b) has 
thoroughly criticized it. I defend Waters’s theory by showing that non-systematicity is 
unproblematic. I also argue that Weber’s desiderata for theories of causation are too restrictive and 
insensitive to developments in biological technology. I finally challenge the most fundamental 
assumption in the framework of causal specificity—that bijective functions are most specific—
thus calling for its reassessment. 
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Introduction 
Philosophers of biology debate whether some causes are more important than others in an 
explanation. The proponents of causal parity maintain that all causes of an effect are equally 
important. By contrast, the advocates of causal privilege argue that some causes are more important 
than others. According to the latter, a number of causes may be privileged and the degree to which 
each is privileged relative to others can differ (Waters, 2007; Weber, 2006; Woodward, 2003). I 
will explain the important aspects of this discussion using Waters’s (2007) terminology. 
Waters specifies conditions that a cause must meet in order to ‘make a difference’ in an 
effect (e.g., protein synthesis). The basic idea is that if a cause accounts for the variation in an 
effect (which occurs in a real population), then it is a difference maker with respect to that effect. 
Causes that counterfactually could have made a difference but that do not actually do so are called 
potential difference makers. Causes that do make a difference are called actual difference makers. 
If only one cause makes the difference, it is called the actual difference maker. If a number of 
causes make the difference, then each is an actual difference maker. Causes that actually make a 
difference are clearly more important than those that do so only potentially, since they account for 
the actual variation in the effect. The particularly difficult issue concerns the degree to which some 
given an actual difference maker is privileged relative to another. More precisely, let A:{x, y, z} 
denote the set of causes that actually make a difference in effect B. The crucial question is whether, 
say, x is privileged over y and z by degrees p and q, respectively. If so, we need to understand what 
this ‘degree’ is. 
The degree of causal privilege is measured in terms of causal specificity (defined in section 
I), a concept developed by Weber (2006) and Woodward (2010). The central idea is that the more 
‘closely’ the values of the cause variable map to those of the effect variable, the more specific the 
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said cause is with respect to the effect (as compared with its other causes). Waters (2007) claims 
that the causal specificity of the DNA is greater than that of the splicing agents vis-à-vis their 
common effect, mature mRNA. As a result, the DNA is the most privileged cause in this context. 
Although he largely supports the general framework of causal specificity, Marcel Weber (2006, 
2017a, 2017b) has systematically criticized Waters’s particular theory of causation. Specifically, 
he has argued that the theory’s focus on actual populations often prevents it from being systematic. 
I aim to accomplish three tasks in this paper. The first is to defend Waters’s theory of 
causation against Weber’s criticisms. The second is to examine the desiderata of theories of 
causation and argue that Weber’s conditions seem unreasonable. The third is to criticize a 
fundamental assumption about causal specificity that its proponents share. In the first section, I 
outline Weber’s (and Woodward’s) account of causal specificity and provide some empirical 
details from molecular biology to contextualize the discussion. In section two, I explain Weber’s 
criticism that Waters’s theory is not systematic. I defend Waters by showing that this problem is 
not unique to his theory but is a feature of the explananda that all theories of biological causation 
need to contend with. 1,2 In the third section, I discuss some general issues around the desiderata 
for theories of causation and argue that Weber’s conditions are unreasonable. The fourth section 
is concerned with criticizing the widespread assumption that bijective functions are causally most 
specific; I demonstrate that a type of non-bijective function can be more causally specific, thus 
 
1 I am focusing on Waters’s (2007) theory in part because it presupposes Woodward’s (2003), so 
a successful defense of the former entails a defense of the latter (cf. Weber, 2006). 
2 Despite Weber’s critique over the last decade or so, neither Waters nor Woodward has responded 
to him except for Woodward’s quick mention of Weber (2006) in a footnote (2010, 305, footnote 
17). At present, none of Weber’s papers on ‘causal specificity’ is cited by either Waters or 
Woodward. 
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suggesting that the framework’s core assumption be reassessed. In the final section, I briefly 
highlight some implications of my arguments for debates in philosophy of biology. 
I. Causal specificity and its relation to molecular biology 
Causal specificity is defined in terms of ‘functional mapping.’ Suppose cause C and effect E are 
discrete variables, each ranging over finite sets of values. The causal specificity of C corresponds 
with how ‘closely’ its values map to those of E. More precisely, suppose that C and E range over 
{c1, c2, …, cm} and {e1, e2, …, en}, respectively, and the function f maps C-values to E-values 
(Weber, 2006; cf. Woodward, 2010).3 The larger the number of C-values that map to their 
corresponding E-values, the more specific C is as a cause of E (as compared to its other causes). 
If each and every C-value maps to one and only one E-value, then the mapping is bijective, making 
C the most specific cause of E (Woodward, 2010).4 
The debate about the relative specificities of various causes emerged in the context of 
molecular biology. In eukaryotes, sequences of nucleotides on the DNA are transcribed into the 
pre-mRNA using certain enzymes, such as the RNA polymerase. The pre-mRNA molecule is 
broken down and reconstituted using ‘splicing agents,’ which work in conjunction with other 
enzymes and background ‘cellular machinery.’ The parts of the pre-mRNA that are excised are 
known as introns, while its remaining parts are known as exons. The exons are combined to 
constitute what is then called the mature mRNA, a molecule used in protein synthesis. 
 
3 The function presupposes Woodward’s (2003) manipulability theory of causation, according to 
which it should answer counterfactual questions such as, what would happen if C-value changes 
from c1 to c25. If f is counterfactually robust—as causal generalizations in biology should 
reasonably be—then E-value would change to e25. 
4 I am assuming that the sizes of the two sets are identical (i.e., m = n). 
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Waters (2007) claims that the DNA and splicing agents both make a difference in the 
mature mRNA molecule, but the former is causally more specific. That is, the number of DNA-
values mapping to the mature mRNA values is greater than the number of splicing agents’ values 
mapping to those of the mature mRNA. Therefore, genes are the most specific or privileged cause 
of the mature mRNA. 
II. Systematicity of Waters’s theory of causation 
Weber (2017b) argues that Waters’s theory is not systematic, because it focuses on actual 
populations. He points out that the frequency of a given causal variable differs radically from one 
biological context to the next. For example, the frequency of splicing agents is much higher in 
eukaryotes than in prokaryotes. As a result, their causal specificity is significantly greater in the 
former than in the latter. Waters’s theory purports to answer general questions, such as whether 
the causal specificity of the DNA is higher than that of the splicing agents. However, its focus on 
actual populations precludes it from treating a causal variable in a systematic fashion, thereby 
preventing it from answering general questions. Weber writes, “The main problem is that 
[Waters’s theory] is very sensitive to the relative abundance of a causal factor in some defined 
population. Thus, [the causal variable’s] values will be highly context dependent, to such an extent 
as to make any kind of systematic comparison across contexts difficult” (2017b, 578). The theory 
cannot therefore be used to answer general questions about a variable’s causal specificity, and 
consequently, it does not allow systematic, cross-contextual comparison between the specificities 
of two (or more) causal variables. No doubt, variables whose frequencies are relatively uniform 
across biological contexts (e.g., RNA) do not pose problems for Waters’s theory. So, to be precise, 
Weber’s claim is not that Waters’s theory can never treat a variable systematically. Instead, his 
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argument is that it cannot systematically analyse a causal variable whose frequency radically 
differs between contexts. 
According to the advocates of causal privilege, the central purpose of developing theories 
of causation is to explain why biologists choose certain causes over others when explaining some 
phenomena that occurs in real biological populations (Waters, 2007; Woodward, 2003). Now, it 
is not a feature of Waters’s theory that the frequency of splicing agents differs between eukaryotes 
and prokaryotes. Rather, this is a biological fact that all theories of causation must contend with. 
Consequently, there is nothing distinctive about Waters’s theory that warrants the charge of non-
systematicity. Consider a simple analogy. All empirical scientific theories face the problem of 
induction, the drawing of universal generalizations on the basis of finite evidence. This problem 
makes scientific theories fallible in principle, because there could exist some evidence that refutes 
the theory (Nola & Sankey, 2014). However, it would be peculiar to exclude some of the theories 
on this basis but spare others. 
If Weber’s criticism is to hold water, he needs to show that either (i) Waters’s account fails 
to be systematic as a result of its own theoretical shortcomings, or (ii) there is at least one other 
theory that systematically analyses causal specificity. If he attempts to show (i), he must do so by 
referring solely to Waters’s theory, not to its explananda. As I have argued, he relies on the 
intractability of the explananda to criticize the theory. Alternatively, Weber may demonstrate (i) 
by showing (ii), because the latter entails the former: if a theory can systematically analyze causal 
specificity, then the inability of Waters’s theory to do the same must be the result of its internal 
features (or of its application). In other words, if another theory can provide a systematic analysis, 
then this gives good reason for thinking that the explananda are tractable after all. Consequently, 
the failure of Waters’s theory to do the same cannot be the result of its explananda. Its failure 
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would arguably be the result of its theoretical apparatus. However, Weber’s criticism satisfies 
neither (i) nor (ii). Therefore, it does not provide reasonable grounds for deeming Waters’s theory 
uniquely problematic. 
III. Biological normality and desiderata for theories of causation 
My purpose here is to extend the foregoing discussion by analyzing the conditions Weber thinks 
theories of biological causation must meet. I will argue that Waters’s theory meets these 
conditions. I will also suggest that the conditions themselves are quite misplaced. 
Weber (2017b) claims that any plausible theory of causation must meet the conditions of 
‘biological normality.’ A causal intervention is biologically normal if it (a) results from natural 
processes with non-negligible probabilities and (b) is compatible with the ordinary biological 
functions of the organism. For instance, DNA transcription is a natural process with non-negligible 
probability and is compatible with the organism’s functions. I think Waters’s (2007) theory meets 
these conditions. The causal interventions in actual biological populations are by definition natural 
and compatible with the organism’s functioning. It is impossible to consider normal biological 
populations without also thinking about their causal relations as natural and compatible. 
Alternatively, the concept of actual populations would be vacuous, if not self-contradictory. 
Accordingly, Waters’s theory cannot fail to meet these conditions, because it explicitly focuses on 
and restricts itself to actual populations. Hence, the theory satisfies the conditions its critic thinks 
any acceptable theory of biological causation should meet. 
A particular reading of Waters (2007) makes it even more difficult for his theory to fail to 
meet Weber’s conditions. The conditional reading begins with the fact that biologists consider 
certain causes as more important than others when explaining some phenomena. The task of 
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Waters’s theory, on this reading, is to provide a principled account that explains their choices. In 
particular, its task is to answer questions of the following kind: given that a number of causes 
account for the variation in the effect, which of these is causally most specific? All of the ordinary 
causes a biologist invokes when explaining some phenomena are natural causes compatible with 
the organism’s functioning, thus satisfying Weber’s conditions (a) and (b), respectively. The 
conditional reading takes this as a given, and the purpose of the theory, on this reading, is to 
provide a principled account of the relative importance of various causes. Hence, on the conditional 
reading, Waters’s theory will always meet Weber’s conditions. 
Let us turn to a more general discussion of Weber’s conditions and examine whether these 
demands capture the intuitions about theories of causation that philosophers of biology have in 
mind. I will focus on Weber’s first condition, which states that a causal intervention is biologically 
normal if it (a) results from natural processes with non-negligible probabilities. This requirement 
is problematic for at least three reasons. First, natural processes with negligible probabilities 
remain philosophically unanalyzable even though they are ordinarily thought of as biologically 
normal. For instance, (successful) genetic mutations have very low probabilities. However, they 
are causally significant for explaining a wide variety of biological phenomena, such as phenotypic 
variation. In Waters’s terminology, genetic mutations are causes that make a difference, and 
biologists no doubt invoke them in their explanations. Yet, if condition (a) is accepted, genetic 
mutations (and other natural processes with negligible probabilities) would remain unanalyzable 
from the perspective of a philosophical theory of causation. In short, this condition wrongly 
excludes improbable factors that are nonetheless causally relevant. 
The second reason that this condition is problematic is that theories of causation which 
satisfy it will not analyze non-natural interventions. Interventions are usually thought of as “non-
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natural” if they cannot occur without the use of technology. Nonetheless, some non-natural 
interventions, such as in vitro fertilization or genomic editing, are often highly relevant for 
explaining biological phenomena. Indeed, the advent of technology allows biologists to intervene 
in very specific ways. A philosophical theory that fails to analyze this excludes important aspects 
of biological phenomena. Weber’s condition has precisely this effect: it deems as unacceptable 
philosophical theories that analyze non-natural but causally relevant interventions. Once again, the 
condition is too restrictive and, importantly, it is insensitive to developments in biological 
technology. 
Third, Weber’s condition is problematic because the boundaries between ‘natural’ and 
‘artificial’ are more difficult to define than he assumes. For example, gene editing is arguably non-
natural because it is carried out using technology. However, edited genes are transcribed and 
translated into proteins using ‘natural’ processes. Only the initial cause in this chain of events is 
supposedly non-natural. The subsequent causes are perfectly natural. Indeed, gene editing 
technology meets the second condition that (b) the interventions be compatible with the rest of the 
organism’s functioning. However, by requiring that interventions be natural, condition (a) 
precludes theories of causation from selecting causally relevant factors in technologically altered 
populations. In other words, on this condition, theories of causation will altogether ignore 
populations with ‘non-natural’ interventions even if these interventions are causally fundamental 
(e.g., gene editing). Consequently, the condition is, once again, unduly restrictive and insensitive 
to developments in biological technology. 
Furthermore, Weber’s conditions are in tension with his criticism (presented in the previous 
section) that Waters’s theory fails to treat a causal variable systematically. On the one hand, his 
condition (a) requires theories of causation to focus only on actual populations. On the other hand, 
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his criticism of Waters’s account suggest that he requires theories of causation to be systematic, 
implying that they should not be susceptible to the changing reality of actual populations. A more 
charitable interpretation is that he requires the theories to be systematic despite the mutability of 
biological phenomena. However, as I argued in the previous section, it is difficult to see how a 
theory can be systematic when its explananda is highly mutable. This is surely the case with 
biological populations, as Weber himself claims. As a result, it is difficult to see how theories can 
restrict themselves to actual populations and be systematic. It seems, then, that these two 
requirements are in tension with one another. Minimally, the desiderata for theories of causation 
must be mutually agreeable. They would otherwise require theories to perform incompatible tasks. 
Weber’s requirements (of biological normality and systematicity) fail to meet even this demand. 
In light of these considerations, it is natural to ask Weber to explain how these two 
requirements are compatible. There are at least two courses of action available to him. First, he 
may argue that while no actual theory of causation has succeeded in satisfying these requirements, 
it is possible that some theory could meet them. Second, he may develop a theory that satisfies 
both requirements. However, no actual theory of causation (that I am aware of) meets these 
requirements, suggesting that they are overly restrictive. This rules out the second course of action. 
As for the first course, it needs to be shown how exactly a theory could be systematic and focus 
on actual populations. It is insufficient to stipulate conditions without providing at least a sketch 
of a possible solution. Weber has not provided a sketch of any kind. 
Finally, I want to return to the requirement of systematicity. I have already suggested that 
this requirement is overly demanding. Nevertheless, even if we assume for argument’s sake that it 
could be satisfied, the new insights gained from a systematic analysis of causal specificity do not 
sufficiently advance our understanding of biological causation. Generally speaking, philosophers 
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of biology no longer maintain that biological generalizations are universal. They recognize that 
the generalizations only distribute over well-defined domains (Waters, 2007). In my view, the case 
of causal specificity should be understood within this framework; there is no need for cross-
contextual, domain-general comparisons when domain-specific analyses suffice. For instance, it 
can be meaningfully asked whether the causal specificity of the DNA with respect to some effect 
is greater than that of the splicing agents with respect to the same effect within a well-defined 
population. If ‘yes,’ then we have reason for thinking that, in this particular context, the DNA is 
more causally important than the splicing agents with respect to a given effect. 
However, systematic analyses do not provide insights of this type. In particular, it is not 
very informative to compare the specificities of two (or more) causal variables with respect to 
different effects (in same or different contexts) or same effects (in different contexts). The former 
are uninformative because there is no relevant commonality based on which the differences could 
be meaningfully compared; the latter only tell us that a certain cause is more specific than its 
counterpart with respect to the same effect in a number of contexts. Yet, as Weber rightly points 
out, the frequencies of variables radically differ between biological contexts. So even if a 
systematic analysis generated new insights, it would remain largely uninformative when applied 
to genuine populations. In light this, it is clear that domain-general or systematic analysis is usually 
uninformative. Yet, that is precisely what the requirement of systematicity demands from theories 
of causation. Because this requirement is not conducive to advancing our understanding of 
causation in biology, it is best to altogether eliminate it. 
IV. Are bijective functions (causally) most specific? 
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The aim of this section is to challenge the fundamental idea in the framework of causal specificity: 
that bijective functions are causally most specific. I will introduce some technical terminology 
before explaining that a type of non-bijective function can be more specific. 
In the first section, I explained specificity in terms of mapping between variables. Let f be 
a function that maps C-values to E-values. f is considered a function if and only it meets the 
following conditions. First, all C-values must map to some E-value; there cannot be unmapped C-
values. Second, no C-value can map to more than one E-value; each C-value must map to at most 
one E-value. Nothing about E-values is relevant when determining whether f is a function. 
 A surjective (‘onto’) function is one in which all E-values are the image of some C-value 
under f, meaning that there are no unmapped E-values. A function is injective (‘one-to-one’) when 
each E-value is the image of at most one C-value under f. That is, given that some E-values are 
mapped, each of these is mapped by at most one C-value. A function is bijective if and only if it is 
surjective and injective. The following diagram summarizes these concepts: 
 
This framework can be used to map genuine causal relations in biology and to determine 
their relative specificities. The table below presents some bona fide causal relations alongside their 
respective mappings (Weber, 2017a, 17-8): 
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Stage of gene expression (C→E) Mapping f(C)=E 
1: DNA → DNA (replication) Bijective 
2: DNA → RNA (transcription in prokaryotes) Bijective 
3: RNA → DNA (reverse transcription) Bijective 
4: DNA → pre-mRNA (transcription in eukaryotes) Bijective 
5: pre-mRNA → mature mRNA (in eukaryotes) Not a function5 
6: exon parts → protein domains Surjective non-injective 
7: mature mRNA → proteins (translation in eukaryotes) Surjective non-injective 
 
In this framework, Weber favors a numerical interpretation of the specificity of these 
mappings. He writes, “Depending on the range of invariance and the number of values that the 
independent [C-values] and dependent [E-values] variables can take, we can speak of a relation 
being more or less causally specific” (2006, 606; my emphasis). He claims that “[t]he elements in 
the codomain [E-values] may be mapped onto by different number of arguments [values] from the 
domain [C-values] (in the surjective and non-injective cases), or different proportions of elements 
in the codomain may be mapped onto by an argument from the domain (in the injective and non-
surjective cases)” (2017a, 16; my emphasis). But in the same paper he distances himself from a 
proportional notion when he writes, “By “causally most specific” I mean that genes bear 
Woodward’s relation INF [influence] to proteins in the highest degree. By “the highest degree” I 
mean that the number of values that the variables on both sides of the INF relation can take is 
vastly higher (i.e., many orders of magnitude) than that of any other causal variables that bear the 
 
5 Because parts of the pre-mRNA are excised (introns), some of its values cannot map to those of 
the mature mRNA. Consequently, pre-mRNA to mature mRNA mapping does not constitute a 
function. 
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relation INF to protein sequences (e.g., splicing agents)” (2017a, 32; my emphasis). Weber clearly 
favors a numerical conception of causal specificity, according to which one ought to count the 
number of mappings between C-values and E-values. The greater the number of mappings between 
C and E, the more specific the former is as a cause of the latter (as compared with its other causes). 
The functions that arguably exhibit the highest number of mappings are bijective, leading to the 
consensus view that they are causally most specific (Weber 2017b; Woodward, 2010). 
I want to argue that surjective non-injective functions can be more specific than bijective 
functions. If this is true, then the assumption that the DNA is causally most specific may need to 
be reevaluated. To be sure, I am not claiming that the DNA actually fails to be the most specific 
cause. Instead, my argument will try to show that the consensus view—that bijective functions are 
always causally most specific—is not correct. 
 Consider a cause F:{1, 2} and its effect Z:{a, b}. Suppose the function m:F→Z bijectively 
maps F to Z. Consider another cause G:{1, 2, 3} and its effect Z:{a, b}. Suppose the function 
n:G→Z surjectively non-injectively maps G to Z. Let G(x)=F(x) but let G(3)=G(1)=F(1), meaning 
that G-values ‘1’ and ‘3’ and F-value ‘1’ map to Z-value ‘a.’ Calculating causal specificities using 
Weber’s approach generates values 2 and 3 for m and n, respectively. That is, two values of F and 
three of G map to Z, meaning that the latter (surjective non-injective) is more specific than the 
former (bijective). Thus, the same effect can have two causes such that the one which maps to it 
bijectively—which is presumably the most specific mapping—is less specific than the one that 
maps to it surjectively non-injectively. This is particularly problematic for the proponents of causal 
privilege, because they regard some of the higher-order causal relations in biology (e.g., mature 
mRNA → proteins) as involving surjective non-injective mappings. They also consider the most 
fundamental and specific causes (e.g., DNA → primary transcript) as bijective. 
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Bijective functions being less causally specific than surjective non-injective functions 
provides a reason for re-examining the framework. The important intuition behind the idea that 
bijective functions are supposedly most specific is that nothing seems more specific than one cause 
giving rise to one and only one effect. This intuition seems prima facie correct. Nonetheless, the 
framework allows non-bijective functions to be more specific. Consequently, the issue is likely 
with the “number of values” conception used here. As a result, alterations may be required to make 
this approach work. One suggestion is that the mappings could be used without requiring that they 
be functions. This would provide more room for theoretical development. More radically, an 
altogether different approach may be developed that (quantitatively) captures the idea of causal 
specificity (cf. Griffiths et al., 2015). 
V. General implications and conclusion 
I will briefly highlight some implications of my arguments. First, the proponents of causal 
privilege (Waters, 2007; Weber, 2006; Woodward, 2003, 2010) agree that some causes are more 
important than others when explaining some phenomena. While there are differences about which 
cause matters to what degree in some context, the authors agree that some causes are definitely 
privileged over others. Waters’s (2007) theory, which relies on Woodward’s (2003) manipulability 
theory of causation, is one of the most thoroughgoing attempts at developing a theory of causal 
selection in biology. Its central purpose is to provide an alternative to causal parity, according to 
which all causes in an explanation are equally important. In this paper, I explained the criticisms 
of Weber, a proponent of causal privilege, against Waters’s theory. If my defense of the latter is 
successful, however, it may go some way in resolving issues internal to the framework of causal 
privilege. More optimistically, this defense could unify the various proponents of causal privilege, 
and a robust account of causal privilege as an alternative to causal parity may be developed. 
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 Second, I argued that Weber’s conditions for theories of biological causation are overly 
restrictive. I suggested that these conditions should not prevent theories of causation from 
analysing causal interventions made using technology. Given the widespread increase in genetic 
technology, it seems misplaced to regard as irrelevant factors that are causally significant in 
biological explanations. As such, the desiderata for theories of biological causation may need to 
be reassessed. 
To conclude, I explained what causal specificity is and how it relates to molecular biology. 
I tried to rebut Weber’s argument that Waters’s theory fails to be systematic. I also showed that 
the theory meets Weber’s conditions of biological normality, and I argued that his conditions are 
quite unreasonable. Finally, I showed that surjective non-injective functions can be more specific 
than bijective functions, thus suggesting the need for re-evaluating at least this tenet in the 
framework of causal specificity. 
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